This paper studies the e¤ect of …rm entry deregulation on the returns to skill and education. We use matched employer-employee data for the universe of workers and …rms in Portugal and exploit a comprehensive episode of entry deregulation, unique in the industrialized world, as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate how increased competition a¤ects wages. We …nd that after the reform the returns to a university degree increased by around 5 percent and the returns to skills increased by around 3 percent. We include match (worker…rm) …xed e¤ects and thus identify the e¤ect from individuals who stay in the same …rm after the reform. Results are therefore not driven by changes in employment composition, and are supportive of education and skill becoming more valuable after the reform.
Introduction
All countries regulate …rm entry but the extent and nature of the regulations vary widely across the world. 1 Overly-restrictive regulations are likely to be ine¢ cient and have knock-on e¤ects on competition, innovation, employment, wages and economic growth. Deregulation, and in particular the removal of restrictions on …rm entry, has been a signi…cant policy recommendation during the last few decades. Aghion et al. (2009) exploit a number of policy reforms in the UK during the Thatcher era to study how entry a¤ects innovation and productivity growth by incumbent …rms. Aghion et al. (2008) study the e¤ects of dismantling the License Raj in India on registered manufacturing output, entry, employment and investment. The e¤ects are found to di¤er across states with di¤erent labor market regulations. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) show that entry regulation in the retail trade industry in France had a negative e¤ect on job creation and employment growth.
This paper exploits an episode of comprehensive entry deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment, and uses linked employer-employee data of the universe of the private sector's …rms and workers in Portugal to investigate the e¤ects of deregulation on entry, competition and the returns to education and skill. In July 2005, the new government established the "On the Spot Firm" program. 2 This initiative was created to reduce the time, cost and complexity of starting a business. Prior to 2005 to start a business an entrepreneur would need to visit several public o¢ ces and it took 11 procedures, 20 forms and 78 days, making it slower than in any other EU country, and the fees were around 13.5% of GDP per capita. 3 The "On the Spot Firm" program created one-stop shops where entrepreneurs can register a company in a single visit in less than an hour and at a cost of around 3% of GDP per capita. As a result of this reform, Portugal went up in the World Bank "Doing Business" index from 113th to 26th.
A large body of literature has shown that entry and competition spur productivity growth and innovation (e.g. Aghion et al., 2009; Djankov, 2006; Gri¢ th and Harrison, 2004; Gri¢ th, 2001 ; and Blundell, Gri¢ th, and Van Reenen, 1999) , which suggests that the issue is of some importance as European governments search for institutional policies to boost economic growth. This paper contributes to this search by identifying the e¤ects of a single precisely de…ned policy reform. We use the deregulation reform in Portugal as an exogenous source of increased product market competition and provide quasi-natural experimental evidence of the e¤ects on wages.
We exploit the cross-time and cross-municipality variation in the implementation of the business registration reform for identi…cation to measure its e¤ects on the returns to education and skill, 1 Djankov et al. (2002) report that while in Italy an entrepreneur needs to follow 16 di¤erent procedures, pay US$3946 in fees, and wait at least 62 business days to acquire the permits to start a business, an entrepreneur in Canada can …nish the process in two days by paying US$280 in fees and completing only two procedures. resulting from the increase in competition. 4 The unusually rich and detailed information from the employer-employee dataset Quadros de Pessoal allows us to obtain estimates that account for individual-or match (…rm-worker)-speci…c unobserved heterogeneity, as well as changes in industry composition and regional e¤ects.
The theoretical mechanism that underlies the link between product market competition and returns to skill or education is based on principal-agent theory. Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003) investigate the e¤ect of competition on the distribution of pro…ts across …rms, and how executive compensation responds to changes in competition. In these models, compensation is the result of a two-stage game in a principal-agent setting. Vives (2004) , develops a more general model to analyze the e¤ect of competition on relative pro…ts and on product and process innovation.
These models consider the agency problem between owners and managers, but their implications can be applied more broadly to other workers in the …rm. In particular, if as product markets become more competitive, pro…ts become more sensitive to costs, …rms can reduce production costs either by incentivizing managers or by hiring more skilled workers. In this scenario the motives for managerial incentives also hold for rewarding skills or education. As discussed in Guadalupe (2007) , to the extent that skilled workers are more productive than unskilled workers, increased product market competition may induce …rms to compete with each other to hire high-skilled workers, which translates into higher returns to skill.
Our results show that the business registration reform had a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the number of new …rms created. These results are consistent with what has been reported in other studies of the e¤ect of deregulation on …rm entry (see for example Bruhn (2011) who uses a similar …rm entry deregulation in Mexico). In particular, we …nd that, on average, municipalities with one-stop shops observed around 4.3 additional new …rms being created within each industry per year. We also …nd that the deregulation had a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on industry concentration ratios and on the Her…ndahl-Hirschman index (HHI), suggesting that it increased competition within industries.
Commonly used measures of competition, such as concentration ratios or the Her…ndahl-Hirschman index face a number of clear limitations discussed in the literature, including potential endogeneity, correlation with omitted variables, non-monotonicity. The main contribution of our paper is therefore to exploit the "on-the-spot …rm" business registration reform as an exogenous source of increased competition to present quasi-natural experimental evidence of the e¤ects of competition on the returns to skill and education. Our results suggest that after the reform the returns to having a university degree increased by around 5%, while the wage premium to being high-skilled increased by around 3%. We control for individual …xed e¤ects thus eliminating potential bises arising from unobserved individual characteristics. We also control for industry, municipality and year e¤ects to parse out any industry or region characteristics or business shocks that might a¤ect our outcomes. In some of our speci…cations we control for …rm-worker (match) …xed e¤ects, and the wage premium to education and skill remains similar in magnitude and statistical signi…cance. In those speci…cations, the e¤ect of the reform on returns to education and skill is identi…ed from individuals who stay in the same …rm or in the same industry after the deregulation. This suggests that the wage e¤ect re ‡ects not merely higher wages in new jobs but is commensurate with education and skills becoming more valuable after the reform.
Our paper is related to the literature that has studied the e¤ects of large U.S. deregulations on wages. This literature has focused mainly on deregulation in a single industry. In particular, Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) and Card (1986 Card ( , 1996 study the e¤ect of deregulation in the airline industry in the U.S. on relative earnings of air transport workers. Hirsch (1993) and Rose (1987) analyze wage responses to deregulation in the trucking industry. Black and Strahan (2001) and Wozniak (2007) study the e¤ect of deregulation in the U.S. commercial banking industry on the wages of workers. Our paper adds to this literature by investigating the e¤ects of an economy-wide episode of entry deregulation, which reduced red tape and increased …rm entry across industries, on the returns to education and skills, a di¤erent aspect of the wage structure. 5 Another strand of the literature has studied the e¤ects of international trade on wages.
Closely related to our paper, Guadalupe (2007) wage inequality: quality upgrading due to increased exports. Using the late-1994 peso crisis as a source of variation he shows that quality upgrading induced by the exchange rate shock increased within-industry wage inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature and the theoretical background. In section 3 we describe the "on the spot …rm" business registration reform in Portugal. Section 4 describes the data used and presents descriptive statistics. Section 5 performs correlation analysis between industry concentration ratios and HHI (common measures of competition) and returns to education and skill. Section 6 studies the e¤ect of the "on the spot …rm" program on the creation of new …rms, and on industry concentration ratios and HHI. Section 7 presents the quasi-natural experiment and discusses the results of the e¤ect of the deregulation on returns to education and skill. The last section concludes.
5 Wozniak (2007) and Guadalupe (2007) are two notable exceptions that have studied wage inequality. Wozniak (2007) studies the e¤ect of deregulation in the banking industry on wage inequality for banking employees. Guadalupe (2007) studies the e¤ect of foreign competition on returns to skill.
Theoretical Background and Related Literature
To the extent that the business registration reform analyzed in this paper reduced entry barriers, it increased competition in the product market. We analyze this hypothesis in section 6 below, before we investigate the e¤ects of the increased competition on the returns to education.
The theoretical link between product market competition and compensation is analyzed by Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003) in a principal-agent setting. They investigate the e¤ect of product market competition on the distribution of pro…ts across …rms, and how this a¤ects the compensation scheme. In Schmidt (1997) the competitive environment in which the …rm operates a¤ects the contracting between the manager (agent) and the shareholder (principal).
Although in this model the employee is modeled as the manager, its predictions could also be applied to any other workers in the …rm. An increase in product market competition reduces pro…ts and has two e¤ects on the incentives to exert e¤ort. On one hand it induces the manager to work harder for a cost reduction to avoid liquidation and keep her job, and the owner to provide steeper incentives to the manager. On the other hand, if competition reduces the value of a cost-reduction to the owner, he may want to provide ‡atter incentives. Overall the e¤ect of competition on incentives is ambiguous. Raith (2003) allows for entry and exit of …rms. As a result of increased competition, prices and pro…ts decrease leading some unpro…table …rms to exit. This restores the original pro…t level and eliminates the opposing e¤ects of a fall in pro…ts present in Schmidt (1997) . The model predicts unambiguously that an increase in competition leads …rms to provide stronger incentives to their managers to reduce costs. Vives (2004) provides a more general model to analyze the e¤ect of competition on product and process innovation. The net e¤ect of an increase in competition on cost-reducing investments depends on both the residual demand and the elasticity of residual demand faced by the …rm. The net e¤ect is ambiguous for most measures of competitive pressure. For example, an increase in the number of competitors will decrease the residual demand for the …rm and increase the demand elasticity. The …st e¤ect tends to decrease R&D e¤ort while the second tends to increase it, as a unit decrease in costs will decrease price with a higher e¤ect on output.
The e¤ect of changes in competition on the various aspects of compensation to managers and other skilled workers is also an empirical question, which has received some attention in the literature. This previous literature, however, has focused mainly on deregulation in a single industry. In particular, Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) and Card (1986 Card ( , 1996 study the e¤ect of deregulation in the airline industry in the U.S. on relative earnings of air transport workers. Hirsch (1993) and Rose (1987) analyze wage responses to deregulation in the trucking industry.
The authors …nd that union premia over nonunion wages declined sharply after the deregulation.
Black and Strahan (2001), Wozniak (2007) and Cuñat and Guadalupe (2008) study the e¤ect of deregulation in the U.S. commercial banking industry on the wages of workers and executives' compensation in the banking sector. Our paper adds to this literature by investigating the e¤ects of an economy-wide episode of entry deregulation, which reduced red tape and increased …rm entry across industries, on the returns to education and skills, a di¤erent aspect of the wage structure.
Another strand of the literature has studied the e¤ects of international trade on wages.
Closely related to our paper, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005) and Guadalupe (2007) study the e¤ect of increased competition, resulting from the European Single Market Program and the 1996 appreciation of the British pound, on wages and the returns to skill. The former …nd an increase in the performance pay sensitivity of compensation, particularly for executives, and the latter that the returns to skill increased with the increase in competition. Verhoogen (2009) proposed a new mechanism linking trade and wage inequality: quality upgrading due to increased exports. Using the late-1994 peso crisis as a source of variation he shows that quality upgrading induced by the exchange rate shock increased within-industry wage inequality.
Finally, our paper is related to the general and vast literature on wage inequality. 6 3 Entry Deregulation in Portugal: The "On the Spot Firm" The total expenses were around 13.5 % of GDP per capita. 7 The "On the Spot Firm" (Empresa na Hora) program was created to reduce the time, cost and complexity of starting a business. 8 This initiative established one-stop shops where entrepreneurs can register a company in less than an hour. It brings all the agencies into a single o¢ ce so entrepreneurs do not need to visit several public o¢ ces to get the required documents 6 See the seminal contributions by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), and Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998 The law that creates the "On the Spot Firm" was issued in July, and in the same month pilot one-stop shops were launched in four municipalities. 9 The 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main data source used in this paper is the Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longitudinal data set with linked information on workers and …rms based in Portugal. These data have been collected annually by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and answering the survey is legally mandatory for all …rms employing at least one worker. The data include 9 Coimbra, Aveiro, Barreiro and Moita. 1 0 Administratively, Portugal is divided into 308 municipalities. The municipality is the seat of local administrative and executive power. 1 1 The program allows registration of all companies (single-shareholder companies, private limited companies, partnerships or public limited companies) except state-owned companies or …rms in industries with industryspeci…c requirements, or which require special permits. These are mainly in the …nance, insurance and transportation sectors; see Branstetter et al, 2010 for more details, and for a list of industries which cannot be registered on the one-stop shops. We exclude observations in these industries from our analysis. all …rms (over 250 thousand per year) and employees (more than two million per year) within the Portuguese private sector. In 2009, the most recent year for which the data is available, the dataset includes over three million workers and about 400 thousand …rms. Each …rm and each worker have a unique registration number which allows them to be traced over time. 14 In general, the information refers to the situation observed in the month of October of each year, when the survey is collected, and it covers the …rm, each of its plants and each of its workers. Information on workers includes, for example, gender, age, education level (schooling), level of skill, occupation, type of contract of employment, hiring date in the …rm, promotions, monthly hours of work (normal and overtime) and earnings, which are split into each of its components (base wage, seniority payments, regular and irregular bene…ts, overtime pay).
Firm level data include, for example, the year of creation, industry, location, total number of workers, number of establishments, sales volume, legal structure and ownership structure (equity breakdown among domestic private, public or foreign). The administrative nature of the data and its public availability at the workplace, as determined by law, result in a high degree of coverage and reliability. 15 The second data source used in this paper is the International Trade dataset collected by the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE). This dataset includes the universe of monthly export and import transactions by …rms that are located in Portugal. The data comes from customs return forms for extra-European Union trade. For intra-EU trade, the data is collected through the INTRASTAT declaration form supplied to INE. For this paper we use data on export transactions only, aggregated to the …rm-year level.
We focus our analysis on the decade in which the "On the Spot Firm" program was introduced. Therefore, for the combined data set which merges the two data sources described above, we use data collected each year from 2002 to 2009. 16 We restrict our analysis to the private sector's manufactures and services, excluding agriculture, …shing and mining. Table A.1 in appendix reports the description (and the percentage distribution of observations) of the SIC 2-digit industries considered.
The resulting sample is composed of 431,692 distinct …rms (contributing with 1,871,296 …rm-year observations) and 3,899,878 workers (contributing 16,485,860 worker-year observations) over the period. We identify the creation of new …rms using the reported year the …rm was 1 4 Each …rm entering the dataset is assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying number. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security performs several checks to ensure that …rms that have already reported are not assigned a di¤erent identi…cation number. Similarly, each worker is assigned a unique identifying number based on the social security number. We use these identi…ers to follow workers and …rms over time. 1 5 The requirement of public availability facilitates monitoring by the Ministry of Employment of the …rms' compliance with the law (e.g., with regard to illegal work). The data from Quadros de Pessoal has been used by Cabral and Mata (2003) to study the evolution of the …rm size distribution; by Blanchard and Portugal (2001) to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor markets; by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) to study the di¤erence between contractual and actual wages, among others. constituted. A …rm is considered to be a start-up if the year of creation is equal to the year of analysis. However, because the survey is collected in October, we recover some information on …rm births if the year of creation is equal to t 1, but the …rm is observed for the …rst time in t. In these cases, we set the year of creation of the …rm to t: The distribution of …rms (existing …rms and …rm startups) and workers per year are shown in Table 1 . Over the sample period there was a path of net …rm and job creation, as the stock of …rms and workers increased year after year. In 2009 we start seeing the e¤ects of the global economic crisis and observe net …rm and job destruction. Regarding the "on the spot …rm" program, in 2005 23% of the new …rms were created in municipalities with one-stop-shops, while after 2008 more than 70% were.
Overall, in our data, 42,567 …rms were created within counties with one-stop-shops.
[ Table 1 about here]
The monthly wage of the worker is constructed by summing: (i) the base pay -gross amount of money paid (in the reference month) to workers on a regular monthly basis for the normal hours of work; (ii) tenure related payments; and (iii) regular payments. Real hourly wages, used in our speci…cations, are computed as real monthly wages (excluding overtime pay) divided by normal monthly hours of work (excluding overtime hours). The Quadros de Pessoal matched employer-employee data records information on both the education levels and the skill levels attained by each worker. We exploit this information and investigate the e¤ects of the reform on the returns to education, and also on the returns to skill. Firms are also requested to classify workers into 8 levels of quali…cation according to the complexity and responsibility of the tasks performed and the skill requirements of the task.
The 8 levels of quali…cation are: 1 -Top executives (top management); 2 -Intermediary executives (middle management); 3 -Supervisors, team leaders and foremen; 4 -Higher-skilled professionals; 5 -skilled professionals; 6 -semi-skilled professionals; 7 -non-skilled professionals; 8 -Apprentices, interns and trainees. Table A .2 in the appendix shows a detailed description of the hierarchical levels and their skill content in accordance with the law. 18 Each of these hierarchical levels can be considered as a layer in an hierarchy de…ned in terms of increasing responsibility and task complexity. For our analysis, the skill levels were collapsed into three categories: high-(levels 1 to 4), medium-(level 5) and low-skilled workers (levels 6 to 8). We also include the occupation as separate control in the regression analysis.
Our regressions include additional characteristics of the workers as covariates: gender, age and tenure (and their squares), the type of contract of employment held (whether open-end or closed-end contract), and occupation (7 categories). 19 We also control for …rm characteristics: log of the size (size is measured by the number of workers employed by the …rm), ownership status (private, public or foreign owned, depending on wether more than 50% of the …rms' social capital is owned by private, public or foreign investors), whether the …rm is an exporter and whether the …rm is multi-plant. Industry, municipality (19 regions), and year dummies are also included to control for unobserved municipality and industry-speci…c characteristics, and aggregate shocks.
Descriptive statistics of the variables by education and skill levels are presented in Table 2 . 20 In our sample, 12% of the workers have a university degree, and 23% are high-skilled workers.
Medium-skilled workers represent the largest share (41%) of the labour force. Amongst the high-skilled workers, 42% have a university degree or higher, this con…rms that our measure of skill is not a simple output of academic achievement of the workers. Conversely, 78% of highly educated workers performs more complex (high-skilled) tasks. Regarding the "on-the-spot" program, 41% of our observations are located in municipalities with one-stop shops. 21 [ Table 2 about here]
Industry Concentration and Returns to Education and Skill
This paper uses the "on the spot …rm" entry deregulation reform in Portugal to investigate whether …rm entry deregulation increases the returns to education and skills through increased product market competition. In this section, we start by documenting the correlation between 1 8 See the Decreto Lei 121/78 of July. 1 9 Occupations are recorded with six digits in accordance to the National Classi…cation of Occupations 1994. This is compatible with the International Standard Classi…cation of Occupations (ISCO) 1988. We aggregate the classi…cation of occupations into ISCO-88's major groups. The major groups are: 1 -Directors; 2 -Intellectual and scienti…c specialists; 3 -Professional and technical (intermediate); 4 -Administrative and managerial; 5 -Clerical and sales workers; 6 -Agriculture, silviculture and …shing; 7 -Production and related workers; 8 -Equipment operators and labourers, 9 -unquali…ed workers.
For our analyses we cconsidered occupations 1 and 2 to be one group; and occupations 6 and 7 as another single group.
2 0 For the sake of clarity and space, descriptive statistics on region, industry and year are not shown, but can be provided upon request to the authors. 2 1 Since we want to interpret the e¤ect of the "on-the-spot" program on wages, we do not consider municipalities of the last year of introduction of on-the-spot shops. This means that we removed all records (for all years) associated to the municipalities for which the on-the-spot shops were introduced in 2009. competition and wages. We consider four commonly used measures of competition, de…ned at the industry (SIC 2-digit), municipality and year level: industry concentration ratios de…ned as the fraction of industry employment by the …ve largest …rms (CR5employment) or by the fraction of industry sales accounted by the …ve largest …rms (CR5sales) within the municipality; and the Her…ndahl-Hirschman index of industry employment or of industry sales. These measures are interpreted as inverse measures of competition. In the next section, we proceed to our quasi-natural experiment and report reduced-form evidence on the e¤ect of the "on the spot …rm" program on the returns to education and skill.
In what follows, we exploit the panel variation to assess the relationship between competition and the returns to education and skill. We regress the logarithm of real hourly wages of individual i; in …rm j, in industry s, municipality m, with educational level (skill level) k in year t on the measure of competition (CR5 or HHI), denoted by CI smt , in the industry-year within municipalities, and its interaction with education (skill), CI smt S ikt (ISCED1 and low-skill are the omitted categories), among other controls. We therefore run the following speci…cation:
Where CI smt is one of the four concentration indicators of industry s; in municipality m, at time t, and S k;it is our measure of educational attainment (skill) of the worker, as described in Section 4. X 0 it is a vector of individual characteristics, Z 0 jt is a vector of …rm characteristics (as described in Section 4, Table 2 ). We control for unobserved permanent individual characteristics Results from estimating model (1) using employment-based concentration ratios and HHI as measures of competition are reported in Table 3 . We obtain similar results, available upon request, when using sales-based measures. The upper part of Table 3 reports results for the e¤ect of competition on the returns to skill, while the lower panel of the table reports results for the returns to education. Column (i) relates to a basic OLS speci…cation which includes gender, age and tenure (and their squares) of the worker as covariates, along with industry and year dummies. In column (ii) we specify a within groups regression (i.e., we include individual …xed e¤ects, d i ) with the same set of covariates (except for gender); in column (iii) we specify the same within groups regression model, but including dummies for education (skill) interacted with year thus allowing for changes in returns to education (skill) over time in a ‡exible way. Column (iv) further saturates the model with dummies for municipality, and includes the occupation and type of contract of the worker, the log of size and the ownership of the …rm, as well as whether the …rm is multiplant or exporter.
The results for returns to skill, reported in the upper panel of Table 3 show that the coe¢ -cient of interest, on the interaction between the skill levels and the industry concentration ratio, is negative and statistically signi…cant. This suggests a negative correlation between concentration and returns to skill. In other words, results suggest that when competition increases the gap between high-and low-skill wages widens. Results obtained when using HHI to measure competition are consistent with the ones using the CR5 measure. Results reported in the last four columns of table 3 show a negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient on the interaction between skill levels and industry HHI. The coe¢ cients are also of similar magnitude.
The results for the correlation between industry concentration (or competition) and returns to education, are reported in the lower panel of Table 3 . Contrary to the results on returns to skill, which show a clear negative e¤ect of increased concentration on the returns to skill, a differential e¤ect of industry concentration by education levels in not found. The coe¢ cient on the interaction between industry concentration and education levels is not statistically signi…cant, regardless of the measure of concentration used, CR5 or HHI.
[ Table 3 about here]
While the results shown in Table 3 suggest that an increase in industry competition is related to larger returns to skill, the results are really only suggestive of correlations, because the use of concentration ratios and HHI as proxies for industry competition faces a number of clear limitations. These include: (i) the potential endogeneity resulting from the fact that these measures of concentration are endogenous outcome variables from the implicit competition parameters or barriers to entry; (ii) they are potentially non-monotonic in the competition parameters, for example, as discussed in Sutton (1991), higher competition generated via a reduction in entry barriers can lead to an increase in concentration in some industries; (iii) potential correlations with an omitted variable such as technical change; (iv) the fact that, conceptually, concentration ratios may not be good measures of competition. For example, as documented in Boone (2000) , if …rms di¤er in e¢ ciency levels, an increase in competition can drive ine¢ cient …rms to exit the industry and thus increase concentration in the industry, not decrease concentration.
Therefore, the results presented in this section should be regarded as descriptive rather than showing of a causal e¤ect. To try to establish a causal link between increased competition and returns to education and skill, in the sections that follow we use the "on the spot …rm" program, which increased …rm entry across industries, as an arguably more exogenous source of increased competition.
"On the Spot Firm" Program, Firm Entry and Industry Concentration
Before presenting results from the quasi-natural experiment on the returns to education and skill, we start by investigating the e¤ect that the "on the spot …rm" program had on …rm entry and competition. The purpose of this analysis is to assess the validity of the "on the spot …rm" program as a source of increased competition. In this section we investigate whether the reform of business registry increased …rm entry and competition within industries. We do this by estimating the e¤ect of the "on the spot …rm" program on (i) the number of new …rms created (positive correlation expected) per year within a municipality; and on (ii) the concentration measure (negative correlation is expected) of industry (s) in municipality (m) and year (t).
That is, we estimate the following model speci…cations
In all speci…cations the "on the spot …rm" dummy variable (Spot mt ) takes the value of 1 for the year when and after an "on the spot …rm" shop was introduced in municipality m in year t, and 0 otherwise (see Figure 1 for an overview of opening dates of the "one-stop shops" The results of the analysis of the e¤ect of the "on the spot …rm" program on the number of new …rms created in municipality m and year t (model 2) are displayed in Table 4 . The top panel of the Table relates to a linear model of the number of …rms created, while the bottom part relates to a negative binomial model for the same count data.
[ Table 4 about here]
Our results suggest that the business registration reform increased the number of new …rms created. The coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is always positive and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. Looking at our negative binomial speci…cation (bottom panel), the di¤erence in the logs of expected counts of new …rms is expected to be between 0.90 and 1.34 units higher if "on the spot" shops exist. In other words, on average, municipalities with "on the spot" shops have around 4.3 more new …rms being created within each industry per year (see ME on Table 4 , column iii). Therefore, the e¤ect of the "on the spot …rm" program is economically meaningful with respect to the predicted number of …rms created.
Our the same dependent variable. 22 Our results suggest a negative e¤ect of the reform on industry concentration, the coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is always negative and and statistically signi…cant. These results suggests that the business registration reform had a positive e¤ect on industry competition.
[ Table 5 about here]
Our results on the e¤ect of the "on the spot" …rm on industry concentration also hold when we measure it by the Her…ndahl-Hirschman indices (HHI). Estimates of model 3 using the HHI of employment within industry (s) in municipality m and year t are displayed in the top panel of Table 6 , while the bottom panel relates to HHI of sales volume within industry [ Table 6 about here]
In sum, results reported in tables 5 and 6 suggest that the business registration reform played a signi…cant role in increasing competition within industries. Given the potential problems associated with using concentration ratios and HHI as measures of competition, in the next section we use the "on the spot …rm" program as a an exogenous source of increased competition to present quasi-natural experimental evidence of the e¤ects on the returns to education and skills.
The Regulatory Quasi-Natural Experiment
The main results in this paper come from an exogenous event that reformed business registration in Portugal. As shown in the previous section, this reform has lead to increased …rm entry, and is associated with increased product market competition, measured by concentration ratios and HHI. In this section we investigate the e¤ect of the reform on the returns to education and skills.
Empirical strategy
We use cross-municipality-speci…c and cross-time variation in the implementation of the business registration reform in Portugal to identify the e¤ect of the deregulation on the returns to skill and education. As discussed in Section 3, in order to alleviate the bureaucratic burden of setting up an enterprise, the government that took o¢ ce in March 2005 approved the law that created "on the spot …rm" in July of the same year. This policy change was an unanticipated event, and arguably constitutes an exogenous policy change in business registration that induced changes in …rm entry and industry competition. 23 The one-stop shops are o¢ ces where entrepreneurs can register a new business in less than an hour. These shops were initially established in only a few municipalities, but progressively expanded to the rest of the country, as shown in Figure 1 . Given that the timing of adoption of the reform varied across municipalities, we can exploit this time variation in our identi…c-ation strategy. We therefore provide di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates of changes in returns To investigate the e¤ects of the business registration reform on the returns to education and skill we estimate the following model:
where the dependent variable is the log of real hourly wages of worker i (in …rm j, municipality m with skill/education level k) in year t. Spot mt is our treatment dummy for municipalities (m) with one-stop shops; it takes the value of 1 in the year when and after a one-stop shop was introduced in the municipality. 24 S k;it is our measure of skills or educational attainment of the worker (the levels S k were described in Section 4). X 0 it is a vector of individual characteristics, which include age and tenure and their squares, occupation and type of contract; and Z 0 jt is a vector of …rm (j) characteristics which include the log of …rm size, ownership structure (whether domestic private, public or foreign), a dummy for whether the …rm is an exporter, and a dummy for whether the …rm is multi-plant. Industry (d s ) and time (d t ) dummies are also included in all speci…cations to account for unobserved industry characteristics and business shocks that a¤ect all …rms and workers.
We also control for municipality (d m ) …xed e¤ects to parse out any municipality-speci…c factors that may a¤ect our outcomes. Although we exploit cross-municipality and cross-time variation in the implementation of the reform, having a panel of linked employer-employee data allows us to include individual and worker-…rm (match) …xed e¤ects in our speci…cations, d i and d ij , respectively. These e¤ects help controlling for potential biases arising from individual heterogeneity on the patterns of job mobility and sorting of workers across …rms/industries. As discussed in Guadalupe (2007) , unobserved time invariant worker e¤ects also serve as control for compositional changes over time in observable characteristics within an industry. ijmkt is an error term assumed to be white noise. In all of our speci…cations standard errors are clustered at the industry level to account for potential correlation between observations within the same industry. Tables 7 and 8 report results from estimating equation (4) . Two sets of analyses were conducted: one to investigate the e¤ect of the …rm entry reform on the returns to education (Table 7) ; and a similar analysis to investigate the e¤ects on the returns to skill (Table 8 ). Observed characteristics of workers (X 0 it ) and …rms (Z 0 jt ), as explained in the previous sections, along with industry (d s ) and year (d t ) dummies are always included. The di¤erent columns in tables 7 and 8 relate to di¤erent combinations of the other …xed e¤ects included. In addition to industry and year dummies, column (i) also controls for worker unobserved e¤ects (d i ), column (ii) further adds in municipality …xed e¤ects (d m ) and column (iii) controls for match (…rm-worker) unobserved e¤ects (d ij ) and municipality dummies. The coe¢ cient on the Spot mt variable, , captures the average e¤ect of the reform on the wages of the least educated or least skilled workers (the omitted categories). The absolute e¤ects on other workers are given by the sum of and the relevant element of . Our main interest lies in , the vector of coe¢ cients on the interaction terms between the experiment variable, Spot mt , and the educational (skill) levels, S k;it . Each of its elements ( k ) captures the e¤ect of the reform on the returns to di¤erent educational and skill levels.
Results
[ Table 7 about here] Table 7 reports the results on the returns to education. The interaction terms between the educational levels and the reform dummy, are always positive and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. In particular, the coe¢ cient on the interaction between the ISCED 5/6 and the treatment variable is 0.045, suggesting that after the introduction of the "on the spot …rm" program the returns to having a university degree increased by around 5%. Similarly, the reform increased the returns to upper secondary education by around 2% relative to the omitted category (primary education). Thus, our results suggest that the business registration reform is associated with increased wage premia to better educated workers. These results are robust to the inclusion of worker-…rm match unobserved time invariant e¤ects. This is important because while in the individual …xed-e¤ects models (columns (i) and (ii)) the e¤ect of the reform is identi…ed from both the individuals who stay in the same …rm and those who move …rm after the policy change, in the match …xed-e¤ects speci…cations (column iii), the e¤ect is identi…ed only from variation over the time period for individuals who stay in the same …rm. This ensures that unobserved changes in composition of employment are not driving our results. In sum, education (university degrees in particular) became more valuable after the deregulation reform. Table 8 reports results of similar speci…cations using skill levels, instead of educational attainment levels. The estimates suggest that the "on the spot …rm" reform is associated with an increase in returns to skill. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term between high-skill level and the experiment dummy is estimated at around 3% and is always statistically signi…cant across the di¤erent model speci…cations. This suggests that the reform is associated with an increase in the wage premium for high-skilled workers of around 3%. The increase in the premium for medium-skilled workers, however, is smaller (below 1%) and of uncertain signi…cance, while the least skilled appear to have lower wages in treatment municipalities by half to one percent.
[ Table 8 about here]
Robustness
As mentioned in section 3, entrepreneurs are not obliged to register a new …rm in the municipality of the company's location. Although according to the Institute of Registration and Notarization, and discussed in Branstetter et al. (2010) , the share of …rms registered outside their municipality is "trivially small", in this section we address that concern by aggregating municipalities to the district level. Portugal is divided in 20 districts which are the largest geographic subdivision of Portugal with administrative and judicial authority. Given their size and administrative authority, it is very unlikely that an entrepreneur would register a company outside of its district.
Therefore, we test the robustness of our results to de…ning the reform dummy at the district level. To this end, we de…ned a new treatment dummy, Spot rt ; which takes the value 1 in the years when and after the …rst one-stop shop was introduced in a district. 25 Therefore, Spot rt is a regional indicator for the introduction of the reform (instead of a municipality indicator). We then substitute this for Spot mt in equation (4), leaving everything else the same. Results from estimating this new equation with di¤erent combinations of …xed e¤ects (as described in the previous section) are reported in Table 9 . They are consistent with those obtained previously, suggesting that the introduction of the business registration reform within regions increased the returns to education and skill. When we consider the existence of regional "on the spot" …rms, we obtain a wage premium of about 5-6% to university graduates, and of about 4-5% to highly-skilled workers.
[ Table 9 about here]
In sum, we have found a positive association between the business registration reform and increased competition. We have also identi…ed wage premia for better educated workers, and larger premia for higher levels of educational attainment; we have also identi…ed wage premia for highly skilled workers. The e¤ects are estimated from within worker variation in the period after the reform. Alternatively, we include worker-…rm …xed e¤ects and thus identify the e¤ects from individuals that stay in the same …rm after the reform. Results are therefore not driven by changes in employment composition, and are supportive of education becoming more valuable after the reform. We start by investigating the e¤ect of the program on …rm entry and industry competition.
Our results suggest that the reform increased the creation of new …rms, and decreased industry concentration ratios and Her…ndahl-Hirschman indices. We then use the business registration reform as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the e¤ects on the returns to education and skill. We exploit cross-municipality-year variation in the implementation of the business registration reform for identi…cation. Our results suggest that the reform increased the wage premium of university graduates by around 5%, and that of being a high-skilled worker by around 3%. Less educated and low skilled workers, on the other hand, appear to have lost slightly from the reform.
We estimate several speci…cations of the wage model, controlling for di¤erent types of time invariant unobserved e¤ects, and for industry-speci…c e¤ects; in particular, we are able to allow for worker-…rm (match) …xed e¤ects and thus identify the e¤ects solely from individuals who stay in the same …rm after the reform. This is strongly indicative that we have identi…ed a price e¤ect rather than one driven by individuals'changes in employment: that is, education and skills seem to have become more valuable after the reform. The "On The Spot Firm" reform implemented Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable, all speci…cations include as observed covariates: tenure and age (and their squares), industry and year dummies as in Table 2 , and year e¤ects. Column (i) includes indicator for gender. Column (iv) includes as further regressors: the occupation and type of contract of the worker; the ownership status and the log of size of the …rm, whether …rm is multi-plant or exporter. ISCED 1 -up to primary education (up to 6 years of schooling); ISCED 2 -lower secondary education, (9 years of schooling); ISCED 3 -upper secondary education (12 years of schooling); ISCED 5/6 -higher education (over 15 years of schooling corresponding to university degrees). Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
